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THE FILAMENTS OF THE VICARIOUS
JOSEPH VINING*

F

OR1Y years is the unit of work in focus here. You have or will have
units of forty years of your own, a unit of work like this. I hope what
you are doing for me is also for you and your work and your encouragement about the decades behind you or to come. I can best respond to
your generosity with a look back at the course of this effort of mine and its
internal and external connections over time, to illustrate and help us keep
in mind the way we mutually influence each other in our thought and
lives. If the effort of one of us rounded into a unit is made an occasion to
bring us together and a focus for reflection on where we are in our perception and development, it needs its context.
Origins and influences can begin with a biology teacher in secondary
school, J. C. Catt, for whom I wrote a long paper on a drop of pond water.
And I think origins can include the fact my writing was latinate, never I
thought fluent (my school was a la tin academy of sorts). I did have a freshman teacher of English in college, Richard Young, who gave me a real
sense that I, even I, could see things in words, even perhaps ineffable
things. Nonetheless I went into zoology as a major, and was drawn into
embryology, the field focused on form developing from the formless. I
remember C. H. Waddington's humane syntheses of the conceptual
problems, I remember reading and returning to D'Arcy Thompson's truly
beautiful On Growth and Form, 1 and I remember working with Hans Spemann 's "organizers." A continuing influence on me in those years was the
embryologist]. P. Trinkaus in whose laboratory I spent considerable time.
The possibility of a life force still hovered in the field. It was something
special to biology-a force that was not in chemistry or physics just as the
force of law is not. But quite aside from that, the embryology of the time
focused me from the start on wholes rather than parts and wholes not
reducible to their parts.
Then there was a summer studentship at the Woods Hole Marine Biological Laboratory where a visceral sense took hold in me that something
was missing from the inquiry and discussion, and I knew I should not
devote my life to experimental science. A final graduate seminar with the
gentle, careful, and open-minded G. Evelyn Hutchinson, a founder of scientific ecology (the seminar was of all things on limnology, again the study
of ponds), and my writing of an undergraduate thesis for him on neotony
(evolutionary branching from juvenile rather than adult forms), happily
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left me with a lasting impression of the wisdom and culture that could be
associated with professional scientific endeavor. 2 But I wrote my applications for overseas scholarships and simultaneously my law school application essay with the anticipation that law addressed the problem I needed
to explore as science could not, the problem (as I put it then) of connecting "one unique life with other unique lives," which was also "the problem
of there being more than one person in the world."
Evelyn Hutchinson was a bridge to Cambridge. He grew up and was
educated and formed there. He gave me a postcard of the Backs at Cambridge and said it was man's most beautiful creation. Perhaps since the
Cambridge Backs were not designed in any individual's mind, but developed (almost embryologically) over centuries until people said "yes," he
put in me the seed of a continuing conscious wonder about the beauty of
nature, why it is beautiful.
At Cambridge where I read history, as a transition from biology to law,
I came under the influence of Dom David Knowles, then Regius Professor
of Modern History, an exalted position but him a modest man. Knowles
introduced me to medieval nominalism and positivism, and the various
Platonist and idealist opposites. He seemed to embody what he thought
and taught. The same themes were there, reductionism, and form that
could not be reduced. In a way the question of a life force was there in the
enveloping medieval context, and certainly the question of organizations
that were not reducible to their members, just as in embryology. (I was
reading for the Medieval History Tripos, a rather backdoor introduction
to epistemology, hermeneutics, and the other concerns of modern intellectual life). I also read Hegel and Rousseau, and puzzled over their own
pointings to "something more" in organized life than positivism could
conceive. The other intellectual force I remember was Walter Ullmann;
an historian of the Papacy, whom I had as a supervisor for a time. Clearly
the phenomenon of authority was being explored for me in internal ecclesiastical struggles and then in the secular struggle for legitimacy in what
was called Christendom.
None of you has ever told me you have actually frozen on an examination, the stuff of examination dreams. I did once, at Cambridge. One of
the papers we all had to write at the end of the Tripos, whatever our subject of study, was an essay of which we were given just the title. This, the
so-called "English Essay," was meant to be an open-ended examination of
our general culture to be used at the margins in grading our other papers.
There was a practice examination the year before the Tripos. I sat down
in the examination room and before me was a sheet of paper with a couplet on it, on which I was to write for three or four hours-"That frost of
2. Hutchinson's autobiography can do the same. See generally G.

EVELYN

HUTCHINSON, THE KINDLY FRUITS OF THE EARTH: RECOLLECTIONS OF AN EMBRYO
ECOLOGIST

(1979).

2010)

THE FILAMENTS OF THE VICARIOUS

1091

fact, by which our wisdom gives/ Correctly stated death to all that lives." 3
Masefield, though I didn't know that: it might have been composed by the
examiner. An hour in I still had nothing on the page. I got up, turned in
a blank sheet of paper, and left. The next year I did get through the
English Essay on the question set, which was "And did they really want
cakes and ale?" But the couplet on which I froze stayed with me. James
Boyd White pointed out to me that I have been trying to write my answer
ever since.
At law school it was Lon Fuller's first year class in contracts that gave
me the experience of legal analysis or dialectic as something new, a pulling and tugging within the mind which was an approach to reality I had
not seen or felt before. It left me with an experiential ground for believing legal thought not reducible to some other form of thought. The early
realization that legal thought is not reducible fed the exploration of the
legal form of thought as such that I started some twenty-five years later, in
1987, and finished with Newton's S!,eep4 in 1993. I imagine my contracts
class with Fuller was also where my conscious or analytic awareness of the
non-literalness of meaningful language, and its connection to mind, began to stir. I would not say there was a shaft of light for me then, but
illumination grew over time. Fuller certainly had a nascent sense of the
metaphoricity of language itself. He was working against the near worship
of Holmes in law schools, and against Holmsean "positivism" and the "realist" movement in law so unrealistically named, which reflected the ideals
of symbolic logic and the behavioral psychology at large in the general
thought of the time. I also took Fuller's course in jurisprudence, one of a
small number of students-most were across the hall learning too well to
see law as "process" with its substance set aside-and I came to be known
to him if not to know him. In one of his late books, in 1968,5 he quoted a
sentence from something I had written about thought divorced from the
actualities of experience, that I took as a gentle warning about the risks of
leaving practice for academic law.
I was drawn to criminal law in law school, partly by the personal
warmth of Norval Morris visiting from Chicago, partly because I had
taught in Borstals in England (perhaps as a kind of penance for taking so
much from the world) and then, through a Phillips Brooks House program, was teaching again in a prison in Massachusetts. Both "doctrinally"
and in its constant effort to justify what it allowed to be done to a human
being found guilty, criminal law above all confronted a picture of the
human mind as a conditioned system rather than as a center of responsible struggle with value. My first work in practice was in the Office of Criminal Justice in the Justice Department and then on the National Crime
3. 1 JoHN MAsEFIELD, THE POEMS AND PlAYS OF JoHN MAsEFIELD 67 (collected
ed. 1918).
4. joSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP (paperback ed. 1996) (1995).
5. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 10 (Penguin Books 1971) (1968).
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Commission staff, and I began teaching general criminal law when I came
to teach, eventually shifting to concentrate on organizational crime. I was
fortunate to come to Michigan where Francis Allen was dean. I had seen
him in action at the Justice Department, and thought him the most intellectually distinguished law school dean of the time, an elegant scholar in
criminal law, and a good and moral man. He was also someone who wrote
books, which was rare then in academic law. When Lee Bollinger became
dean at Michigan midway through my forty years, he was like Frank in all
these ways. Beyond Lee's influence on me through his example, his perceptions in his books on free speech and toleration that inter alia broke
free from market-based theory, and his readings of what I was doing, he
ensured for a time, a critical time for me, that Michigan continued to be a
place where long term work could be done.
My principal specialization as a student in law school was not however
in criminal law but in administrative law, the law creating and governing
the great administrative agencies in particular regulatory fields-the law
of public organizations. This was the door to consideration again of the
phenomenon of authority. The basic question was whether an official was
speaking on behalf of the agency so that it was the agency speaking, or
whether the official was not, so that his orders had no force beyond his
own puny voice and arm and did not have the "force of law" and would
not be "enforced." And this was the door also to seeing the connection
between authority and perception of a person-here a supra-individual
person. But any regulatory field was also a system, behaving like a system,
rather like what was called a "field" in embryological development. A
charismatic teacher, Paul Bator, introduced me to administrative law, and
I took up an offer by the principal figure in the subject, Louis Jaffe, to
write two chapters of a book he was finally putting together at the end of
his career. This occupied a good deal of my third year in law school.
When I went into private practice in Washington it was administrative
law work I was given, and when I came to teach at Michigan that became
my field. In the summer before starting to teach I had read Geoffrey Vickers' The Art of judgment, 6 on British administrative law, which beautifully
sketched the interplay of human aspiration and the behavior of systems,
and my initial articles worked on the systemic aspect of the administrative
phenomenon. The first was on the importance of time and the effect on
actors in a regulatory field of postponing correction of an unauthorized
agency position (the question was known as one of "ripeness"). The second was on seeing political parties as administrative agencies, building on
some experience as a Democratic Party Hearing Examiner enforcing the
Party's rules.

6. SIR GEOFFREY VICKERS, THE ART OF JUDGMENT: A
(Henry D. Kass et al. eds., Sage Publ'ns 1995) (1965).

STUDY OF POLICY MAKING
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I am sure Vickers and one other book I read with leisure and care at
the same time, Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowl,edge, 7 were particularly important books for me. Polanyi was a chemist, and Personal Knowledge raised
to a new level the great question left by my undergraduate years, the nature and scope of scientific knowledge in a world of persons and individuals. In the matter of the serendipities of life, my father, on the faculty at
Virginia, had been hospitable to Polanyi when he visited there for a term,
and Polanyi had given him a copy of his book. It was that copy which was
put into my hands and I read.
These events and influences were forty and more years ago. I think of
my mind's development since then, and its contribution to the other kinds
of development there are, as being the trajectory of the four books with
which my mind was pretty much continuously occupied until this last decade of my sixties. And I think of their trajectory as more organic than
governed by my own decision, as coming from the within that is mysterious to all of us except those who in their organized thought deny their
own existence. Since Cambridge I had wanted to write the kind of short,
personal, almost conversational book on a subject, a genre of the time, to
which I had been introduced there. Such books had made me feel I was
being pulled into an invisible world of thought, discussion, and even
amusement where the authors themselves lived. Undergraduates at Cambridge fifty years ago were not allowed in the University Library. What we
did was go out and buy books including books of this kind to prepare each
week to write our essays, which we read out loud to our teachers.
I have not mentioned corporate law. I had one securities law case in
practice, representing doctors who helped treat civilians burned by the
napalm being used in the Vietnam War. They owned Dow Chemical stock
and were seeking a shareholder vote on their proposal to stop Dow from
manufacturing napalm. The Securities and Exchange Commission had a
rule against inclusion in corporate voting materials any shareholder proposal motivated by anything other than profit. How these doctors came to
me I do not remember-I was one of I think comparatively few at my firm
who opposed the Vietnam War, and the case involved some intricacies of
administrative law. They won in the D.C. Circuit, 8 the SEC rule was
amended, and eventually Dow stopped making napalm though not just
because of the shareholder proposal. Work on the case fired me, at the
administrative level and then in involvement with the formidable litigator
Roberts Owen who was drawn into it, preparing memoranda for his brief
and argument in the Court of Appeals. Behind the rule being challenged
was a vision, put forward as a legal norm to govern real life, of decisionmaking that was entirely free of any authentic concern for value and without any but an ultimately selfish concern for consequences to others. Cor7.

MICHAEL PoLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TowARDs A PosT-CRITICAL PHI-

(paperback ed. 1974) (1958).
8. See Med. Comm. on Human Rights v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 432 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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porate law, the law of "private" organizations, I viewed as setting itself
against this vision precisely because it was law.
But here this vision was, and strong and pervasive in the literature
too, always surfacing as a position in litigation. I saw the connection between this kind of thinking in economics and a kind of thinking in biology, which now was moving away from any residual sense of life in an
organization (including one of us). And I saw the connection between
private government under corporate law and public government under
administrative law-and the connection between the nature of business
corporate bodies and the nature of administrative agencies-together with
the connection between the questions in each about who the persons were
whose voices, if heard in an individual's voice speaking for them, were
authoritative, and if heard would lead to enforcement by public force.
When I came to teach I offered to teach corporate law as well as criminal
law and administrative law, and my first seminar was built on the Dow
Chemical case. I linked the theoretical vision of indifference to value in
the case to the mens rea of general criminal law, which was the same indifference to value as such. Soon thereafter I began to teach corporate
crime, before casebooks on the subject appeared. I might have whipped
my materials into shape for a published casebook, but my time was always
put to my other books, and the principal effect I had was in introducing
my students to the problems. One who has been like a colleague to me,
Larry Thompson, generalized and formalized federal criminal prosecution of the corporate entity itself when he became Deputy Attorney
General. 9
Happily I taught from and talked with Alfred Conard at Michigan,
following his lead into the corporate field. I still think of his as among the
finest and broadest minds put to corporate law and its associated subjects.
Teaching corporations, associations, partnership, agency, and securities allowed me, forced me, to come up against not just the question of a profit
maximizing mentality, quasi-biological in conception, and the question
what the alternative to that is, but also the question of the irreducibility
and independent reality, to whatever degree, of the supra-individual corporate person who was indeed a person in all the language of legal
analysis.
Nothing matched the thrusts and struggles of corporate law thinking
in what I read in organizational theory from any of the social sciences. It
was sometimes helpful but usually tied to crude presuppositions foreclosing anything of a phenomenological kind that might touch the reality of
living organizations and individuals' ways of identification with one another. When I say I was forced to come up against these questions I have
the method of law school teaching to thank. I could not read lectures in
9. See Memorandum on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads of
Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003) (the "Thompson Memorandum"),
reprinted in 72 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 481 (2003).
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my classes. However prepared I was, in each class I had to persuade other
adults that the questions were real questions and to open myself to being
pressed on them, which I am sure pushed me this way and that as the years
passed.
Thus corporate and "business" law were always in the background in
my mind and work. Friends were surprised at my continuing with it, thinking it sterile, a study in manipulation and disingenuousness and a distraction from thinking about important things. I thought the usual building
blocks of substantive legal analysis, contract, property, tort, crime, constitutional law, could not be understood today without it. I was also something of an odd duck among people who concentrated on corporate and
business law as their specialty. But I involved myself in the field here and
there, and in the American Law Institute's project on the principles of
corporate law, even perhaps helping keep "profit maximization" out of its
final statement of business corporate purpose. 10 Amazingly I was once
brought down to Washington to be interviewed for a seat on the Securities
and Exchange Commission, no doubt because a friend of mine with whom
I had sparred on various questions was on the Commission. I soon withdrew from consideration, which I couldn't believe serious anyway, out of
several concerns including financial ones, but large in them was the fact
that I would have had to stop writing my books, which had hold of my
mind. We all have our ways of searching for or finding understanding and
meaning, and my own seemed to lie in that activity and direction.
For the same reason I never entered the "battles" going on in law
reviews and workshops over issues my books took up or touched upon.
Lee Bollinger chided me for not promoting my books as others did. I
stayed with my gratitude to those who undertook to review them, though I
responded publicly to a review once when the reviewer asked me to do it.
During and after the writing of my first book, which worked with "standing" to be heard in a court, I did not contribute to the stream of articles
on standing in the law reviews. The book was really about something else,
and I felt I had to get on. When writing my second, I gave what became
the first chapter as a public lecture in Canada on the growing bureaucratization of the courts, and was challenged in print by a former colleague
and friend, Harry Edwards, who had become a prominent judge. I did not
take up the debate. Others did a bit, but it faded away, actually because it
10. The original formulation of corporate purpose in AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE AND STRUCfURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 2.0l(a) (Council Draft No. 1, 1981), read "The objective of the business
corporation is to conduct business activities with a view to the maximization of
long-run corporate profit and shareholder gain." After ALI Council review and
discussion of the meaning "maximization" would have in this proposed statement
oflaw, "maximization" was eliminated and replaced by "enhancing," and§ 2.0l(a)
in its final form in AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994), reads "[A] corporation ... should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain."
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is too painful a subject. I had to get on with the book that began with that
lecture, a book in which bureaucratization was only a device, as standing
had been in the first.
There was one book I did not get on with. From early on I had in
mind a book on corporations centered on the problem of profit maximization originally put so sharply to me in the Dow Chemical case. I had
file boxes of notes labeled "Corporate Paper" (so as not to be daunted by
"book"), rising stacks of references from keeping up with the literature.
But I never wrote the book. I applied for grants and sabbaticals using it as
a proposal. But then, if given time and money, I would write something
else. My first book in fact grew out of something I was going to get out of
the way before the corporate book. Whether everyone has a phantom
book in the background I do not know. It made my writing time stolen
time just a bit, more precious and more pressed, and my writing what I
wrote a doing of what I should not be doing, a form of defiance of myself,
which strangely may have freed me. Perhaps I knew by instinct I had not
resolved the questions I would be writing about and that they were perhaps not resolvable, though that should have been a signal to try writing it
all out. 11 I think also I respected technical questions and those who
worked on them, and it seemed in this instance that the investment in
pursuing them and evaluating others' work on them would keep me away
too long from following my mind, swallow me even, as would have taking
up the work of the Securities Exchange Commission.
The four written books then. So much of what I will say here in summary form you will already know. Some of you I met through the books,
reason enough to write them. After the first book, in one combination or
another you made possible the time to write them, you read them in manuscript, affected their final form, saw them through publication with me,
reviewed them for publishers. Steven Smith went so far as to let me read
the last book through his eyes in a published review. I won't repeat what I
said in successive prefaces to you and about you and your impact on them.
I mentioned earlier the special risks in academic law of losing touch with
the legal world beyond. I know the sensitivity of each of you to those risks
has kept them alive to my mind, and I am also indebted, to a degree that
can only be acknowledged, to John Noonan and David Souter speaking to
me from judicial experience over the years, and to Thomas Wright,
11. Those taking up the questions might start with their history, as I would
have, and perhaps with what I think is still, though little known, the finest piece in
English on corporate purpose and the nature of a corporate entity, W. M. Geldart,
Inaugural Lecture before the University of Oxford: LEGAL PERSONALrIY (Nov. 5,
1910) (1924). A piece of my own on these questions might have been found in the
middle of the unwritten book, Carporate Crime and the Religious Sensibility, 5 PUNISHMENT & SocIE'IY 313 (2003), to which there was a helpful reply, Tracy Fessenden,
Response to Joseph Vining's "Carporate Crime and the Religious Sensibility", 6 PUNISHMENT
& Soc1E1Y 105 (2004). This was one of those undertakings in the decade of my
sixties that I owe to Patrick Brennan.
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Princeton University's legendary General Counsel, doing the same from
his experience in legal practice.
The trajectory was first a focus on the person who speaks to a court
about the law, then a focus on the person who speaks for the law, speaks
back as it were, and then a focus on the law that is heard. Each was a
system and also not a system. Finally there was a focus on the place of
speaking persons in general beliefs about the nature of the world, on locating a place for them in a general view, or, if no place appeared to be
there, finding an opening which speaking persons, and law, were slipping
through into our world. Pressing in at each turn was a growing awareness,
on my part, of the difference between an individual and a person, whether
individual person or supra-individual person, and the implications of this
difference for law and for other forms of thought as well. Personhood is
nothing new in history. It is the ancient and continuing reality of the vicarious in human experience. But I have realized that personhood begins
with and from where we are, each of us as an individual at the center of
the universe as we know it. History and especially history many of us have
lived through has had much to do with perception of this, my own and
more generally, though the individual, rather like mathematical truth
which is often and revealingly called miracle or mystery by those who have
direct contact with it, is not a product of history, neither intellectual history-Charles Taylor notwithstanding-nor cultural, nor economic, nor
political history, any more than the center of our being is in sequential
time.
The first book, originally titled "Person, Property, and Public Law,"
became Legal Idmtity. 12 The second book was originally titled "The Shaking Perspective Glass," after Bunyan and his pilgrims' means of seeing
"something like the gate" of the Celestial City and "also some of the glory
of the place." 13 That became The Authoritative and the Authoritarian. 14 The
third book was "The Legal Form of Thought." It became From Newton's
Sleep, 15 after Blake's "May God us keep/From Single vision and Newton's
sleep!" 16 The title of the fourth was from the start The Song Sparrow and
12. JosEPH VINING, LEGAL loENTnY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAw
(1978).
13. JoHN BUNYAN, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS 119 (W. R. Owens ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2003) (1678).
14. JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (paperback
ed. 1988) (1986).
15. See generally Vining, supra note 4.
16. WILLIAM BLAKE, THE PORTABLE BLAKE 209-10 (Alfred Kazin ed., Penguin
Books 1976) ("Now I a fourfold vision see/And a fourfold vision is given to me;/
'Tis fourfold in my supreme delight/ And threefold in soft Beulah's night/And
twofold Always. May God us keep/From Single vision & Newton's sleep!"). These
six lines are the last verse of the poem beginning "With happiness stretch'd across
the hills," which like Blake's "Jerusalem" first appeared set into another text without a title of its own.
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the Child. 1 7
The first, second, and last books were written around a thread. The
thread of the first was the law of standing, but I wanted very much to write
something that would survive changes in the law of standing. The way the
book came about was my taking up for a possible essay the then recent
case of Sierra Club v. Morton 18 on standing to challenge the legality of environmental harm. I moved back to general questions, and realized rather
quickly that in form and style I was writing a book rather than an essay or
article, and that it was on the relation of person and all that is subsumed
under the notion of property. Sierra Club itself ended as a long footnote in
a chapter, the only footnote not moved to the endnotes.
The thread of the second book was the bureaucratization of the
courts. As I have mentioned, the book proceeded from a lecture-essay,
which was on the problems presented by a text when it is not written by
the person responsible for it and speaking it, and the related problems
presented by a text written by many hands. After Legal Identity where I had
worked with close reading of opinions, I had become troubled at what we,
I and others, were doing in our method, on or off the courts, in academic
law or in practice. What could we come up with to say that could warrant
attention, deference, even (as we say) "obedience"? One choice was to
become cynical about the enterprise, as many of my colleagues were becoming. The enterprise was too important for that. I thought of people
in prison, and need only refer today to Jefferson Powell's response to cynicism in law. What I could do with my own troubledness was to mine it for
some understanding of authority itself. Without authority law was not law,
as my colleague Philip Soper was simultaneously insisting in the book he
was writing, A Theory of Law. 19 Indeed his book turned out to end with the
question of bureaucratization my manuscript was taking up as its thread.
During this time the person to whom I had been intellectually closest
as friends in law school left his highly successful practice of law to become
an Anglican priest. This event in John McCausland's life I am sure acted
as an anchor for my mind in the sea of academic temptation, then and
later. Except that the Michigan Law School was a tolerant and civil place,
I was not in an academic or intellectual atmosphere congenial to what I
was doing. I thought more than once that "The Shaking Perspective
Glass" might be a letter to John, even in its form and style. The last chapter took me into theology as the sister discipline of law, by comparison
with any other disciplines that might be put beside law, and this led to
several years of ordering my reading, with John's help and that of the Ca17. JOSEPH VINING, THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD: ClAIMS OF SCIENCE
AND HUMANITY (2004). My title here, "The Filaments of the Vicarious," was drawn
from page 122 of this book, "More filaments of the vicarious connect us than we
can unravel or count," but it would be truer to say David Souter's taking especial
delight in the tliought is my source.
18. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
19. PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAw (1984).
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nadian theologian Philip Lee, by offering a seminar in law and theology.
This in turn led to my discovery of Jack Sammons and his work and his
invitation to me to pursue the connection with him, which I doubt now I
will ever do as I should.
During this time also my sensitivity to the linguistic aspects of law was
being sharpened. I offered a seminar to work through and discuss William
Bishin's and Christopher Stone's new and wide-ranging Law, Language,
and Ethics. 20 Because of Legal Identity, the Chicago Press sent me the manuscript of James Boyd White's When Words Lose Their Meaninlf 1 to read for
them, and I embraced the mind behind it. Jim then came from Chicago
to Michigan, introduced me to The Legal Imagination, 22 painted a cover for
"The Shaking Perspective Glass," and then painted another for Jacques
Barzun's suggested title for it, "The Voice Behind the Scales." Uim also
marked up, criticized, and encouraged what was to go behind his covers.)
Jim and the linguist and anthropologist Alton Becker set up an interdisciplinary discussion group on language and culture and generously asked
me to join, and I was never after allowed to forget or avoid the problem of
human language in anything I did.
The third book did not have its origin in a particular problem that
could become a thread in it. Its origin was in an event in my life, a brush
apparently with death from septicemia, six weeks in the hospital fighting
the infection, and then a long convalescence. I began writing poetry, unable really to write anything else, but also unable not to write it. It was not
an absolutely new experience-the prologue and epilogue of the second
book were poems of a sort. But the experience of responding to what
came, whatever it was, was new, as was the experience of rounding a piece
of writing in a small package, finishing it until it could be finished no
more, in itself and not as part of a larger effort. The muse stayed on my
shoulder for two or three years, and then gradually left. She came back to
give me a little epilogue to my fourth book, but is quite quiet now.
The residue of this was an inclination to listen to my own mind more
than trying to direct it, and, on the questions oflaw to which I returned, to
push each response or offering to its limit, finishing it rather than thinking of it as a part or step in a larger enterprise. I began writing what I
came to call fragments, giving them titles and retrievable numbers, which
filled binders marked "New Work." I had an extraordinary secretary who
devised ways of keeping track of them, which otherwise would have been
like leaves on the ground. Some fragments were presented to the discussion group on language and culture and then reworked. Again, I was not
in entirely new territory. Attached to the end of the second book were
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what its editor came to call "Amplifications," short essays linked by superscripts to the text (the endnotes using word links to the text rather than
superscripts), which some readers had told me they liked.
At some point, I do not remember when, I understood that these fragments had a coherence, and accepted that their connections to each other
should not be surprising since they were proceeding from a mind to which
I was listening and giving way to, letting it have its head as it were. Jacques
Barzun, today in his eleventh decade of life, whose Darwin, Marx, Wagner2 3
had drawn me to bring the first draft of "The Shaking Perspective Glass" to
him, once told me his advice to any writer was never to fail to stop and
note down whatever occurred to you whenever it occurred wherever you
were. What I was doing here was not different, except that I developed
and finished the occurrence rather than holding it for use in a planned
and linear text.
Jim White encouraged me, generously, importantly, to think they
could be put together in a book. Cyril Connolly's The Unquiet Grave, 24 a
collection of fragments, had been a favorite book of mine at Cambridge. I
knew of Pascal and his fragments collected and ordered on strings, though
I had not read Pascal or reflections on him until I thought I must add a
fragment on him (or, perhaps, my mind wanted to pursue a question
raised by what I knew of Pascal). I also realized that here in my own perception of coherence and connections in these fragments, and in what a
reader would be doing in pulling coherence from them or sensing it, was a
mirror of legal method or a recapitulation of it (to use an embryological
term). Here was in fact the experience of reading legal materials and
hearing a voice in them, which could be conveyed in the form of the book
itself. I began to organize the fragments into sections reflecting aspects of
legal thought, and then organize them within sections. I laid them out on
the floors at home to see better how they connected forward and backward, where the repetitions were, and whether repetition should be kept.
They became "The Legal Form of Thought," with an explanatory prologue
and epilogue.
An editor from Princeton, Malcolm DeBevoise, came by the office I
think to ask about the ever possible corporate book. I rather hesitantly
said I had this manuscript instead. He took it and took to it, and surprisingly so did his anonymous readers. It went also to John Tryneski at Chicago, who had had faith in the second book despite its peculiarities, and I
found he and his readers liked it too. I ended with Princeton. My work
and correspondence with DeBevoise over the next years struck me as the
most absorbing sustained intellectual experience of my life. He turned
out to be a distinguished translator on his own, which was not irrelevant to
23. JACQUES BARZUN, DARWIN, MARx, WAGNER: CRITIQUE OF A HERITAGE (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1981) (1941). The epigraph from Barzun in The Authoritative and
the Authoritarian (p. vii) is taken from page 322 of Darwin, Marx, Wagner.
24. CYRIL CONNOLLY, THE UNQUIET GRAVE: A WoRD-CvcLE BY PALINURUS (Penguin Books 1957) (1944).
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the problems I was trying to face (and I should say Jim White's work on
justice as translation was very much in the air at this time, and as well
Alton Becker's emphasis on the residue of the non-translatable in any
human language). What DeBevoise principally translated was French science and philosophy-the fit was providential.
DeBevoise removed the discursive prologue and epilogue to the fragments, which was right, and conspired to enrich the title. We probably
went too far, but I remember Jim White in the hall shouting ''Yes! From
Newton's Sleep," and my wife Alice was in on this also, poring over the
possibilities that included something going equally far based on Tintern
Abbey's wonderful lines, "all the mighty world/ Of eye and ear, both what
they half-create,/ And what perceive. "25 DeBevoise undertook to make it
a beautiful book, which Princeton especially could do. I participated in
the decisions, and when From Newton '.s Sleep came out it won the only prize
any book of mine has won, for its design.
During these years I was also working on a linear text, a lecture exploring the similarity between the problem of authenticity in art, the problem for instance of the imitative, or the jointly created, or the presentation
of a natural object as art (the "obj et trouve"), and the problem of authenticity in law, almost identical to the problem of authority. I gave that lecture, with slides, four times at various places and at various stages of its
development, with titles like "The Venus di Milo With Arms" or "Law as
Art, Law as Science." I have never published it, but I am sure its ultimate
(and unanswered) question, whether nature itself has meaning-or how
nature might have meaning-was pulling on the mind to which I was listening. At the very least it was feeding my growing sense that we participate in creation at the most basic level, each one of us, or "half-create" as
Wordsworth nicely put it. 26 Here too was being highlighted the difference
between the legal form of thought and other forms of thought that explicitly excluded any creation or participation in it.
After this third book was finished I faced for the first time a deliberate
decision what to turn to. The corporate book (of course), or instead what
I found myself collecting notes on and writing new fragments about and
labeling "total theory." I dictated an "Agenda" in 1996: "The second project," I told myself,
is more general. Being more general, not rooted in evidence that I can bring forward and am qualified to bring forward, I realize it is less likely to have impact or success in either
the academic or the nonacademic world. But its question is what
drives me ...
It is an inquiry into the ultimate vision that underlies what
we think and do, which may be different from what we say we
25.
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think and how we characterize what we do. It is questioning the
ultimacy, the basicness, the grounding in the end of everything,
human and material, in system and process.
It has its negative side, an inquiry into the impossibility of
such a vision, its absence in fact from our minds, its inconceivability as an actual alternative.
And it has its positive side, to which it is most improbable I
can make any real contribution, of what we do and can believe,
beyond what we can be sure we do not believe.
This was part of the purpose of Newton's Sleep, to clear the
decks, to push back the claims of process and system as such on
our conscious thinking and accepted vision, by pointing to and
trying to evoke the reality of the legal form of thought. The continuing larger project, for which I have yet to construct a form or
vehicle, may try to go as far beyond law as I can allow and trust
myself to go.
Huda Akil, a much-honored neuroscientist working on the brain, had
joined Jim White's ongoing discussion group on language and culture,
and I found myself both galvanized and tempered by discussions with her
there. Early fragments from 1995-1 continued collecting fragments into
notebooks-were titled "Questions After a Discussion with Huda Akil (2/
95)" and "Notes After Discussion of Total Theory (4/17/95)." Malcolm
DeBevoise sent me page proofs of a book he was editing and translating,
Conversations on Mind, Matter, and Mathematics2 7 by Jean Pierre Changeux,
a well-known neurobiologist, and Alain Connes, an equally well-known
mathematician. I read it enthralled, sentence by sentence, taking almost
as many notes as there were words on the page. He had already given me
the extraordinary reflections of one of the founders of computer programming, Joseph Weizenbaum's Computer Power and Human Reason, 28 that I
had found as gripping as Weizenbaum had found his need to write them
out. I was also teaching a seminar at the time, "Evil and the Problem of
Punishment," which had grown out of my course in corporate crime and a
"Theme Semester" in the undergraduate college in the University on the
subject or question of evil, for which I had been on a planning committee.
The materials I put together for the seminar took me from individual
crime to corporate crime, to the Holocaust, and then to Nuremberg and
human experimentation.
All this simmered until one night, sitting on a sofa in Vermont reading Lewis Thomas' s The Fragile Species, 29 I turned to Alice and said "I have a
27. JEAN PIERRE CHANGEUX & ALAIN CONNES, CONVERSATIONS ON MIND, MATTER, AND MATHEMATICS (M. B. DeBevoise ed. and trans., Princeton Univ. Press
1995) (1989).
28. JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REAsoN: FROM JUDGMENT TO CALCULATION (Penguin Books 1984) (1976).
29. LEWIS THOMAS, THE FRAGILE SPECIES (Simon & Schuster 1996) (1992).
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book." The contending total cosmologies of mathematics and biology,
most immediately Connes' and Changeux's, which were words or thought,
and human and animal experimentation, which was action, came together
in my mind, a test of actual belief when combined. The phenomenon of
human law was pertinent to belief or not in total theory, and the method
of law, reading action as well as statement, and reading a person as a
whole, was applicable in pursuit of what total theorists truly believed as
much as it was applicable in pursuit of what a witness believed, or a court
believed, or I believe, or my readers might conclude they themselves believed. Being on sabbatical, I immediately collected my notes and began
writing, this time not in fragments, but from a beginning to an end. Why
not, really, treat a child as a song sparrow is treated in experiments on the
development of speech-that very speech by which total theories are proposed? I put a picture, side by side, of my new grandson and a song sparrow on the first page of the manuscript that I had titled The Song Sparrow
and the Child.
A sub-title that I eventually discarded was "Belief in Science," with the
"in" pointing both to what scientists actually believe and what openminded nonscientists believe living in the modern world. George Levine,
a literary and cultural critic and author of Darwin and the NovelistS> 0 which
I had read, had picked up and read Newton's Sleep. He asked for a draft of
the Song Sparrow after I met him by chance and we each discovered who
the other was-another serendipity, and he was a passionate birder with a
love of song sparrows. Moving he thought toward an acceptance on his
part of a fully Darwinian view of the universe, he criticized the draft extensively, took a trip to come argue with me, and from then on steadily encouraged and supported me despite what he claimed were very different
views of his own. He was surprised I think by law. I wrote new sections,
cut, and redrafted in response. I dedicated the book to Levine and Malcolm Debevoise. Malcolm, who had left publishing for translation and
writing, argued vigorously with what I sent him not wanting to let him go,
and he led me into more excisions and redraftings and then was strong in
his support. You and others generously read it and pushed me into yet
more-I turned to John Noonan more than once as the manuscript began
to circulate beyond my friends and proved more upsetting than I had
imagined it would. The language and culture group I have mentioned saw
a number of chapters and gave them back to me covered with comments.
I had never worked in such a milieu, or in so leisurely a way, as if I had
time.
The last part of The Song Sparrow and the Child, "The Claim of the
Sparrow," had brought me to the treatment of animals. After finishing the
book I turned to this particularly and began to explore the legal view of
animals in a new seminar on the contrast between human and animal ex30.
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perimentation. The book had built on the good faith of experimental
scientists today in not doing to human beings what they did to animals,
their not holding law or the legal form of thought outside themselves as
whole persons, their not biding their time until they could treat human
beings like animals. But now it seemed to me that the legal protection of
animals, nationally and increasingly internationally, had a much deeper
significance. What struck me was not the difference in the protection but
the very fact and extent of it, and I saw that it was being grounded, increasingly so, not just in concern for systems, utilitarian, ecological, but in recognition of individuality in animals. In this, law was in fact being aided by
scientific investigation. I introduced a course in Animal Law to the curriculum, returning in a way to the biological preoccupations of my young
years, and undertook a form of field work, three years of weekly and sleepdisturbing participation in the federal regulation of Michigan's vast program of animal experimentation as a member of the University's "Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee."
Writing the Song Sparrow at this point in my life was also a step in my
own acceptance of the faith and hope that are in me, and a chapter in my
own opening to what my fellow human beings truly say to me and who
they are when they speak. I became a Catholic eight years ago, but the
path to the Church stretched out behind me. In this you who have been
companions to my mind have also been models for me in your lives. You
have had the same effect saints are meant to have. But while I have found
it possible in the last few years to speak explicitly here and there about
religious commitment, I have all along wanted to speak about law to those
to whom law speaks, whether or not they believed they had a religious
commitment. I think this is true of you too. My correspondence and discussions with Steve Smith go back quite far on all the questions surrounding this faith that assumptions need not divide us in our empirical work on
something that is so part of us all and critical to us all, and Patrick Brennan joined these discussions soon after he and I met. Jeff Powell's work
also, Jim White's, Jack Sammons', Lee Bollinger's, John McCausland's,
John Noonan 's, all of you I read as continuously wrestling with the question of openness and change against a background perception of something universal. Indeed the Church wrestles with it too.
For me, ending with work on the evolving legal status of animals has
been lifting a corner on a dawning realization about the nature of the
world that I think will grow into a major preoccupation of legal thought. I
am happy for you to think of this ending simply as an individual gesture of
recompense on my part for what humans do to animals. But I have been
struck each year by students telling me that the central question they take
away from the study of law relating to animals is the question what makes
us human. My reply is that this is as it should be since the central purpose
of law is to keep us human. Animal law in fact has a long history, at least
from the eighteenth century, in which the sentience, the suffering, and
the individuality of nonhuman creatures have gradually entered legisla-
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tive, judicial, administrative, and lay jury deliberations about what humans
are going to require or allow themselves to do. As this continues, the
human world may change in large ways. Recognition of something beyond the genetic and the environmental in the existences of the sentient
creatures around us, a third factor to put it most neutrally, makes it much
more difficult to deny the same in each other as so much in our language
and our minds today presses us to do. In consequence of it we may even
reset our course toward that holy mountain we have never really tried to
climb.
There is at least that possibility. There are reasons for optimism that
were not there when I was born just before World War II and the Cold
War. One of those reasons is you in this room and what you represent. I
do think there has been for many years a tendency and temptation within
the legal world to mechanize and depersonalize law, even while in the
world in general there has been greater and greater hope placed on the
rule of law and its claims. The work you have done and will do directly
sustains the humane in law, its life, the hope for what it can do for us. It is
work that is rooted in an open-minded empiricism quite as much as the
best work in natural science. I recently reread R. G. Collingwood's Autobiog;raphy,31 written in 1938 as my life was just beginning and published in
1939. Looking back from 1938 Collingwood viewed himself as having
worked all his life against this same tendency and temptation to a "realism" that was not realistic, which he saw in his own fields, philosophy and
history including intellectual history. He thought their effect on his contemporaries was directly connected to what he saw happening and about
to happen in the world, which he would not but we would now call the loss
of law. I marked the similarity between the themes as he saw them in his
time, and the themes as they have emerged in ours. But as I look about
me I am not discouraged. There is a difference between 2009 and 1939
because of what happened after 1939, which is still uncovering and revealing ourselves to ourselves. Animal law is in fact an indication of the
difference. Most I know would think it a small one, but it is not so small as
it may seem.
What work with the specifics of animal law has confirmed for me is
the power of the legal form of thought, and a deep structure that can be
perceived in it, somewhat like, only somewhat but at least somewhat, John
Noonan's extraordinary perception of the change that is no change in the
Church's response to human slavery. The Song Sparrow ended not just
with the possibility and perhaps inevitability of the movement from the
human world into some part of the animal world of a line that is not to be
crossed in the treatment of an individual. It also raised the question
whether, since experimentation on animals has been critical to so many
achievements of modern science, the movement of this line, this line
drawn by law at work in the mind, may mean in practice an intrinsic limit
31. R. G. CoLLINGwooo, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (paperback ed. 1970) (1939).
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on what science will contribute to our human future, and a convergence
in which its form of thought comes to resemble more the legal form of
thought. I cannot but think that you and others will bring the fact and
implications of individuality into our consciousness of connections with
each other and the rest of the sentient world. The effort would be for me
the natural progression if I had the years. I hope too that it will be not
only others but I myself that will awake further to what touches the unique
existences I know and see, and with filaments of the vicarious joins you to
each other, and me to you, and all of us to the unique existences to come
after our time.

***
Patrick Brennan has been the generative force in our coming together in this way. A decade ago Patrick and I met as I was entering my
sixties. After bringing out the Song Sparrow midway through that decade, I
think it possible that I might have laid down the pen if Patrick had not
kept me writing. He pushed me to summarize, to criticize, to move from
the implicit to the explicit, all the while in his own work he was setting the
flag for me beyond the finish line, as it were, going where I had not quite
allowed myself to go. There are very grand words for someone who takes
such a role in another's life, the word ez.er in biblical Hebrew probably the
grandest and the best. Our connection lies behind my enthusiastic endorsement now of our sixties as a time of life much to be looked forward
to. Patrick's work is on the life in living values, the call and pull and claim
of living values, the way they make us human together. If all of us who are
human together were ever really to try to climb the holy mountain, I think
we would find Patrick on the slope ahead of us, asking us to join him.

